# MOBILIZATION REFORM: A COMPILATION OF SIGNIFICANT ISSUES, LESSONS LEARNED AND STUDIES DEVELOPED SINCE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

A SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT ISSUES, RECOMMENDATIONS AND ACTIONS TOWARD MOBILIZATION REFORM

**Office of the Secretary of Defense
Reserve Forces Policy Board
October 2003**

MOBILIZATION REFORM: A COMPILATION OF SIGNIFICANT ISSUES, LESSONS LEARNED AND STUDIES DEVELOPED SINCE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

Introduction

Based on the numerous studies, reviews, conferences, symposiums, and compilation of lessons learned conducted since September 11, 2001, considerable evidence exists, that the current mobilization process is not sufficiently responsive to 21st century operational requirements and will not serve the nation well in the future, given likely demands on the force. While current processes get the job done, they are far from efficient in an environment where processes need to be rapid, flexible, and visible. [1] The mobilization timeline begins with the identification of a force requirement and extends until individuals and units are deployed to meet those requirements. While the current process works to a large degree, it is inefficient, it takes too long, and it is not as responsive as the current environment demands. " [2] While DoD's goal is to conduct mobilizations based on operational plans developed through a deliberate planning process, the department recognizes that during the initial stages of an emergency (domestic response to the terrorist threat) it may have to resort to a crisis action response rather than adhering to its operation plans. [3]

The services have used two primary approaches—predictable operating cycles and advance notification—to provide time for units and personnel to prepare for mobilizations. Because DoD could not rely on existing operation plans to guide its mobilizations, it used a modified process that relied on additional management oversight and multiple layers of coordination, which resulted in a process that was slower and less efficient than the traditional process. Under the modified process, the Secretary of Defense signed 246 deployment orders to mobilize over 280,000 reservists compared to the less than 10 deployment orders needed to mobilize over 220,000 reservists during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. [4]

The "threat-based" approach of the past decade has been replaced by a "capabilities-based" approach. Rather than planning defenses according to who might threaten the United States, the Military Services are looking at how the country might be threatened. More emphasis is being placed on Homeland

---

[1] Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (OASD) and Director for Logistics, J-4, The Joint Staff (CJCS, J4), Mobilizing the Reserve Forces in the 21st Century: Report of the DoD Mobilization Symposium, (Washington, D.C., November 18-20, 2002), v.

[2] United States General Accounting Office (GAO), Military Personnel: DoD Actions Needed to Improve the Efficiency of Mobilization for Reserve Forces, GAO-03-921, (Washington, D.C., August 2003), 12.

[3] GAO, 3.

[4] GAO, 3.

Security. These changes in emphasis require a more flexible force than exists today. [5]

The Reserve Components have contributed significantly to every military operation and will continue to do so in the future. About 300,000 of the 1.2 million National Guard and Reserve personnel have been called to active duty since September 11, 2001. They fought on the front lines in Iraq; tracked terrorists throughout Asia and Africa; maintained the peace in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and now Iraq; and participated in a wide range of domestic missions. [6]

Mobilization Process Challenges

After September 11, 2001, DoD used a modified mobilization process because existing operation plans had not adequately addressed mobilization requirements and changing priorities needed to deal with terrorist attacks. Though the modified process worked, it required more coordination and was less efficient than the normal synchronized process. For example, it was determined that close to two-dozen approvals were needed to mobilize one unit or individual. In addition, a contractor study showed that the monthly averages from February through June 2002 ranged from 18 to 19 days for this portion of the mobilization process. Also, it was noted that the Secretary of Defense signed over 246 deployment orders to mobilized over 280,000 reservists between September 11, 2001, and May 21, 2003, compared to the less than 10 deployment orders needed to mobilize over 220,000 reservists during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. [7]

Some of the more significant mobilization process challenges that were stated repeatedly in various studies, lessons learned submissions, conferences, and symposiums are group in logical categories below.

Automated Systems

- DoD lacks the capability to adequately track individual reservists, requirements, readiness, and resources. In some cases active and reserve components systems were incompatible. [8] The absence of a system to track requirements, personnel and units identified to fill the requirements, and the transportation assets required to move units and personnel, slows

---

[5] Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Review of Reserve Component Contribution to National Defense, (Washington, D.C., December 20, 2002), 10.
[6] GAO, 42.
[7] GAO, 3-4.
[8] GAO, 24.

response times and can cause confusion and chaos. [9] There is a need for an online data system to quickly find Reservists with specific skills or experiences that can be utilized to match requirements [10]

Employer

- No protective measures in place to ensure employer support does not become too great a burden, particularly for small companies; and in the area of income loss among self-employed and small business owners [11]

Family Readiness

- There is no continuity and equity of healthcare for reservists and their families [12]

Pay and Compensation

- There were indications of Service inequity in implementing pay and compensation policies, duty assignment pay, per diem and travel policies[13]

Policy, Law, Doctrine, Plans, Directives, and Documents

- The DoD policy to limit mobilization orders to no more than 12 months, with the possibility of extensions to be determined by the Service Secretary reduces flexibility needed by the Active and Reserve Components in fighting the WOT

- Key DoD and Service guidance—including mobilization instructions and publications—had not been updated, leading to failures in communication and coordination between components and further reducing officials' visibility over the mobilization process [14]

Process

- The mobilization timeline (identifying requirements, validation, sourcing, alert, and mobilization) is too long; the process is not responsive[15]

---

[9] OASD and CJCS, J4, <u>DoD Mobilization Symposium</u>, vii.
[10] Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, <u>RC Contribution to National Defense</u>, 33.
[11] OASD and CJCS, J4, <u>DoD Mobilization Symposium</u>, 41.
[12] OASD and CJCS, J4, <u>DoD Mobilization Symposium</u>, 37.
[13] OASD and CJCS, J4, <u>DoD Mobilization Symposium</u>, viii.
[14] GAO, 29.
[15] OASD and CJCS, J4, <u>DoD Mobilization Symposium</u>, 9.

- Reserve components were not well prepared in the areas of member processing, particularly medical; the security clearance process; training; and equipment processing [16]

- Utilization of mobilization CAPs not flexible enough

- DoD, Joint Staff, and Services mobilization and policy documents, plans, and directives are outdated

- Mobilization process is too centralized

- Request for Forces (RFF) process cumbersome, required much vetting and not efficient at capabilities sourcing

- Not enough full time support to adequately support mobilization process

Readiness

- The process of determining equipment readiness, cross leveling equipment to bring a unit to mission readiness, and shipping of personal supplemental equipment is not efficient.[17] There were instances where units did not bring all equipment to their mobilization station and could not then be supplied by the Mob Station

- The use of derivative units, volunteers, and other tailored force structure concepts has a significant impact on force readiness, adaptability, and individual retention.[18] These factors can affect combat effectiveness, unit structures, unit cohesion, morale, and necessitates units being reconstituted later to meet missions

- Information on the skills and capabilities resident within the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) is not readily available within all the Services.[19] The current practice by the Services of managing their respective IRR personnel resulted in the unwillingness to utilize the IRR

- Medical conditions of individuals were not being adequately tracked in a non-deployable status to ensure that reservists assigned to particular units were, in fact, able to deploy when needed

---

[16] OASD and CJCS, J4, <u>DoD Mobilization Symposium</u>, 14.
[17] OASD and CJCS, J4, <u>DoD Mobilization Symposium</u>, 16-17.
[18] OASD and CJCS, J4, <u>DoD Mobilization Symposium</u>, 20.
[19] OASD and CJCS, J4, <u>DoD Mobilization Symposium</u>, 22.

- Inadequate funding to support the modified process of mobilizing Reserve Component forces; includes funding to support pre-mobilization training, medical readiness, and equipment preparedness

- No standardized joint small unit/individual readiness reporting system policies [20]

Secretary of Defense Concerns

The Secretary of Defense has issued a number of "Snowflakes" since September 11, 2001, regarding Active/Reserve tasks and Force mix, reserve capability, utilization of Reservists, and numerous other mobilization issues. Included here are several key statements that relate closely to the lessons learned and issues developed during the activation and mobilization of forces in support of the War on Terror (WOT).

"It is very clear that there are some distinctive tasks only found in the Reserves that are not found on active duty, which means if you want to do those things you have to activate Reservists. That seems to me to be unwise." [21]

" I think we are going to have to find a way to take all of the responsibility for activating the guard and the reserve from the services, the joint forces command and the combatant commanders and put them in one place so that the flow of forces, whether it is active duty or reserves, is all in one location. We can't do anything skillfully the way it is currently arrayed." [22]

"I have trouble seeing why we have to have a reserve call-up anytime we want to engage in conflict. It simply tips off the fact that that is what we are going to do months before we are able to do it. From the standpoint of strategic surprise, I think that is foolish." [23]

"As we discussed and the President requested, I need to see a proposal as to how we can ease up the pressure on the Guard and the Reserve." [24]

---

[20] GAO, 24

[21] Secretary of Defense Memorandum to Dov Zakheim and Steve Cambone, Subject: Tasks—Reserve v. Active Duty, November 1, 2002

[22] Secretary of Defense Memorandum to Gen Meyers, No Subject, December 21, 2002

[23] Secretary of Defense Memorandum to David Chu, Subject: Reserve v. Active Duty Tasks, December 30, 2002

[24] Secretary of Defense Memorandum to Gen Myers, Subject: Guard and Reserve, May 9, 2003

"As I understand it, you are going to come back to me with some proposals as to how we pull together all the Guard, Reserve, military and civilian elements in DoD and some proposed guidance for General Blum. We also need to look at the total number of people in each skill, so that we don't have to activate people so frequently." [25]

"The goal would be to make sure we have people who can do every needed skill on active duty, so that every time we want to do anything we don't have to activate Reserves." [26]

" The balance of capabilities in the Active and Reserve components today is not the best for the future. We need to promote judicious and prudent use of the Reserve components with force rebalancing initiatives that reduce strain through the efficient application of manpower and technological solutions based on a disciplined force requirements process. To that end there are three principal objectives that I want to achieve. They are:

- Structure active and reserve forces to reduce the need for involuntary mobilizations of the Guard and Reserve. Eliminate the need for involuntary mobilization during the first 15 days of a rapid response operation (or for any alerts to mobilize prior to the operation). Structure forces in order to limit involuntary mobilization to not more than one year every 6 years.

- Establish a more rigorous process for reviewing joint requirements, which ensures that force structure is designed appropriately and which validates requests for forces in time to provide timely notice of mobilization.

- Make the mobilization and demobilization process more efficient. When Reservists are used, ensure that they are given meaningful work and work for which alternative manpower is not readily available. Retain on active duty only as long as absolutely necessary." [27]

Recommendations For Improvement

These recommendations for mobilization process reform have been developed as part of the various studies, symposiums, conferences, and coordinated meetings which included participation by OSD staff, Joint Staff, the Services, Reserve

---

[25] Secretary of Defense Memorandum to Gen Myers and David Chu, Subject: Pulling Together Elements, May 31, 2003

[26] Secretary of Defense Memorandum to David Chu, Subject: Rebalancing Forces, June 9, 2003

[27] Secretary of Defense Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Under Secretaries of Defense, Subject: Rebalancing Forces, July 9, 2003

Component Chiefs, Combatant Commanders, and Component Commanders. The significant recommendations listed that support mobilization process reform are appropriately categorized for easy reference to lessons learned, Secretary of Defense's concerns, and actions being worked to date.

Automated Systems

- *"Develop a single automated system or fully integrated automated systems that will provide for the seamless transfer of reservists information, regardless of whether the reservists are in an active or reserve status"* [28]

- In the near term, Services must resource improvements to their systems to provide necessary information to DMDC. This would provide a "near real time" solution to some, but not all, tracking requirements [29]

Employer

- Strengthen strategic and communications plans for employer and member rights and responsibilities [30]

- Establish legislation and/or resources to ensure sustained employer outreach (mandatory employer reporting, employer compensation, and DoD manpower resources [31]

Family Readiness Issues

- Standardize minimum essential family services to be provided by all Family Support/Assistance Centers and emphasize joint and inter-Service cooperation and assistance [32]

- Establish a demonstration project to provide TRICARE full time for part time Reserve component members, on a self-pay basis, as a means to enhance the medical readiness of reservists and improve support to families and employers [33]

- Promote commitment and resources by all the Reserve components for FEDS-HEAL, an agreement to use Veterans Affairs and Federal Occupational Health medical facilities nationwide to provide physical

---

[28] GAO, 43-44.

[29] OASD and CJCS, J4, <u>DoD Mobilization Symposium</u>, 28.

[30] OASD and CJCS, J4, <u>DoD Mobilization Symposium</u>, 42.

[31] OASD and CJCS, J4, <u>DoD Mobilization Symposium</u>, 42.

[32] OASD and CJCS, J4, <u>DoD Mobilization Symposium</u>, 42.

[33] OASD and CJCS, J4, <u>DoD Mobilization Symposium</u>, 37.

exams, dental screening and care, immunizations and other medical readiness needs of Reserve component members [34]

- Eliminate the 179 day active duty sponsor requirement for TRICARE Prime eligibility; Allow eligible family members to pre-enroll in TRICARE Prime; Establish a recurring TRICARE education program for Reserve component members and their families; Establish a stipend/voucher that would offset the cost to reservists of continuing their employer sponsored healthcare plan [35]

- Consider expanding the number of TRICARE network providers [36]

Pay and Compensation

- Active and Reserve Components, and Combatant Commands should strive to achieve greater consistency regarding pay and other allowances, per diem and stop loss policies [37] [38]

Policy, Law, Doctrine, Plans, Directives, and Documents

- *"The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to identify all of the mobilization requirements that have evolved since September 11, 2001, and create or update operation plans as necessary, to account for these requirements"* [39]

- *"The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs to update their applicable mobilization instructions, notices, and publications"* [40]

- Develop a wartime Joint Manning Document for a standing joint warfighting headquarters, including standing joint task forces [41]

- Submit a legislative change to lift constraints on end strength accountability for volunteers in support of contingency operations [42]

---

[34] OASD and CJCS, J4, DoD Mobilization Symposium, 37.

[35] OASD and CJCS, J4, DoD Mobilization Symposium, 38.

[36] OASD and CJCS, J4, DoD Mobilization Symposium, 37.

[37] OASD and CJCS, J4, DoD Mobilization Symposium, 30.

[38] While these are passionate issues, there is a general consensus that the Services have to be able to surge and manage their forces and other resources—that this is an area in which the Office of the Secretary of Defense should not have direct control or dictate policy

[39] GAO, 43-44.

[40] GAO, 43-44.

[41] OASD and CJCS, J4, DoD Mobilization Symposium, 26.

[42] OASD and CJCS, J4, DoD Mobilization Symposium, 34.

- Retain flexibility of multiple involuntary activation authorities while ensuring predictability for members [43]

- DoD modify the one-year policy by publishing a "SecDef's intent" that emphasizes the judicious use of Reserve component members without restricting Service flexibility [44]

- DoD issue policy… to simply… individual replacement operations [45]

- Develop policies and procedures that support the use of tailored forces, while recognizing and mitigating the risks. Plan and train for the use of tailored forces [46]

- Seek legislative change to expand the options to mobilize members for the purpose of training—amendments to 10 USC 12302, amendments to 10 USC 10147, or DoD policy guidance issued by the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness [47]

Process

- *"The Secretary of the Army to develop a standard operating cycle concept to help increase predictability for Army reserve units"* [48]

- Review the effectiveness of the existing Joint Billet validation process [49]

- Identify one organization as the single source process owner for identifying requirements, generating request for forces, and sourcing requirement based on capabilities. Requests for forces should be prioritized and filled as they are generated; replace sequential decision making with a parallel and collaborative process [50]

- Assign responsibility for integration and synchronization of the overall mobilization process [51]

---

[43] OASD and CJCS, J4, <u>DoD Mobilization Symposium</u>, 34.
[44] OASD and CJCS, J4, <u>DoD Mobilization Symposium</u>, 34.
[45] OASD and CJCS, J4, <u>DoD Mobilization Symposium</u>, 19.
[46] OASD and CJCS, J4, <u>DoD Mobilization Symposium</u>, 23.
[47] OASD and CJCS, J4, <u>DoD Mobilization Symposium</u>, 16
[48] GAO, 43-44.
[49] OASD and CJCS, J4, <u>DoD Mobilization Symposium</u>, 26.
[50] OASD and CJCS, J4, <u>DoD Mobilization Symposium</u>, vi, 11, 12
[51] OASD and CJCS, J4, <u>DoD Mobilization Symposium</u>, 25.

Readiness

- *"The Secretaries of the Army and the Navy to capture readiness information on the resources within all the units that are available to meet the tailored requirements of combatant commanders so that these resources will be visible to key mobilization officials within DoD, the Joint Staff, and the service headquarters"* [52]

- *"The service secretaries to develop and use results-oriented performance metrics to guide service efforts to gain and maintain improved information on IRR members; and the service secretaries to review and update their IRR policies to take into account the nature of the mobilization requirements as well as the types of reservists who are available to fill the requirements"* [53]

- Identify selected unit personnel for early mobilization for duty qualification training [54]

- Ship supplemental personnel equipment to home-station for M-day issue [55]

- During drill periods, permit medical and dental treatment by Reserve component medical and dental personnel

- Invest resources to enhance individual and unit readiness, with particular emphasis on pre-mobilization medical screening, member processing, security clearance processing, training for mobilization, and equipment processing [56]

Security Clearances

- Services need to reexamine and revalidate the requirements for security clearances. [57]   Determine who needs clearances during peacetime to support operations during mobilization, and conduct those investigations

- Priority for security clearance investigations during mobilization; maximize use of interim clearances [58]

---

[52] GAO, 43-44.

[53] GAO, 43-44.

[54] OASD and CJCS, J4, <u>DoD Mobilization Symposium</u>, 18.

[55] OASD and CJCS, J4, <u>DoD Mobilization Symposium</u>, 18.

[56] OASD and CJCS, J4, <u>DoD Mobilization Symposium</u>, vi

[57] OASD and CJCS, J4, <u>DoD Mobilization Symposium</u>, 15

[58] OASD and CJCS, J4, <u>DoD Mobilization Symposium</u>, 18.

Progress Toward Mobilization Reform

The owners of the mobilization process from OSD to the Component Commanders have been working to improve the process, rebalance the forces, and develop sustainability and predictability. Since this paper only focuses on the mobilization reform part of the equation, this section will provide an overview of "what significant actions" are ongoing to date. The issues covered here should be considered as "work in progress" since they have not yet been completely vetted and received final approval; however, they will provide broad perspective on the route being taken and their coverage of the lessons learned and the Secretary of Defense's concerns.

It is essential to make the mobilization process more relevant and effective in our current environment. To do so will require total support and cooperation from the Department of Defense, Congress, and collaboration among the Services, Joint Staff, Reserve Components, Component and Combatant Commanders, and various defense agencies. Throughout the studies, symposiums, and conferences, it has been clear that the Services and Reserve Components have worked hard to respond to the current challenges. They have and continue to pursue positive change toward improvement and have been working together to find the best solutions.

JFCOM/OASD RA Pre-decisional Policy Papers

The following ten policy papers were developed as part of a "Quick Wins" process worked in coordination with USJFCOM, OASD RA, and USD (P&R) with representation from the DoD, Joint Staff, Services, Reserve Components, and Combatant Commanders. The Secretary of Defense directed this effort to "Improve the Mobilization Process" by undertaking …"opportunities to improve policy or process changes that can be implemented within the next three months, to improve the mobilization process" to be completed by 30 September 2003.[59]

Guidelines to Ensure Judicious and Prudent Use of Reserve Components

As the Department of Defense continues its commitment to winning the War on Terror (WOT), the magnitude and duration of the conflict make the Reserve Component's role essential. It is important to protect this vital resource and ensure it remains available and ready to respond. The decision to activate Reserve forces must be made only after determining that it is both judicious and prudent to do so.

---

[59] Secretary of Defense Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, Under Secretaries of Defense, Subject: Rebalancing Forces, July 9, 2003

Consider the following before sourcing a required capability to a Reserve Component individual or unit.

- Activate Reserve forces, when possible, with the consent of the individuals being called to full time duty

- Employ Reserve Component individuals and units in a manner that maximizes the utilization of their core capabilities throughout the ordered duration of activated service

- Activate Reserve personnel for a period of service equal to the duration of the validated requirement or the length of the original orders to active duty which ever is shorter

- Give early consideration to the feasible use of alternate manpower sources – such as active duty forces, coalition forces, host nation support, civilian contracted labor, technological solutions; or other means that may be available

- Apply innovative management alternatives such as retirees and civilian auxiliaries

- When sourcing requirements to Reserve forces, provide as much predictability as is possible to the Reserve members, their families, and employers

Prepare Reserve Force Units For Activation

All of our forces need to be responsive, flexible, agile, and relevant. The readiness level necessary to achieve these goals may pose unique challenges to Reserve forces. In advance of the long-term efforts underway to transform the Reserve Component's force structure, the Services must take every opportunity to ensure Reserve units and individuals are ready to react quickly to a call to active duty or a change of mission status.

In the near term, take those actions prudent and appropriate, and provide additional resources as necessary, to bring service members and organizations to an increased state of readiness, first focusing on units that possess the capabilities most likely to be engaged in future operations.

Appropriate actions can include:

- Improving individual and collective training readiness
- Solving personnel shortages and cross-leveling equipment
- Improving medical, dental, and family readiness

Use of Reserve Forces To Backfill Deployed Active Forces

Reserve forces have historically provided installations with manpower, on a one-for-one basis, to perform the functions and services provided by active members who deploy forward. However, the duration and demands of global conflicts require a new approach that establishes minimum essential requirements and considers alternative manpower sources before activating Reserve forces for this purpose.   When considering requirements ensure the service or function the Reserve member will provide is critical to supporting families and the installation community during the period the active member is deployed. Some alternate manpower sources to consider are:

- Joint and/or regional solutions to provide the service or function in lieu of activating a Reserve individual or unit

- Existing civilian or auxiliary workforces to provide the service or function on a temporary basis while the active member is deployed

- Hiring of civilian contractors to perform the service or function vacated by the active member's deployment, either on the installation or from within the regional community

Activate Reserve medical members to backfill deployed active medical members when:

- There are no adequate regional or joint solutions, including greater reliance on the civil sector, to provide the patient population responsive quality medical care

- Diminished staffing could affect the accreditation of the medical treatment facility, its outlying clinics or its key programs

- The backfill is essential to theater medical evacuation plan

Activating Members of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR)

Members serving the remainder of their service obligation in the IRR can provide depth of capabilities, backfill for attritions or skill augmentation to support

future conflicts. The decision to draw from this resource is a viable option and should be done with the consent of the member being called to full time duty if possible; or if involuntarily activated, preferably using IRR not previously called.

Activating IRR members involuntarily requires SECDEF approval of a coordinated recommendation from the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Services whose current force structure sets conditions for IRR members to be called to active duty as casualty personnel replacements must ensure that the intent, scope, and timing for the involuntary use of IRR members is included in plans presented to the SECDEF for his approval.

In the mid term, review how the IRR is used, confirm the viability of the IRR in today's mobilization environment, track trained and ready IRR for utilization, and examine the use of Stop Loss and the IRR

Mobilization Cap Management

The President, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and with input from the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Secretaries of the Military Departments, shall establish a mobilization cap, when appropriate, for Reserve forces. The Secretaries of the Military Departments will provide justification of Reserve force requirements while applying policies and procedures of judicious and prudent use. To manage the flow of rotational forces, the services may go above the established MOB CAP to provide overlap in support of long-term operations.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in coordination with the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, will establish authorization levels for each Secretary of the Military Departments within the approved mobilization cap.

Procedures for Involuntarily Activating Ready Reserve Members

The Military Departments may activate without additional notification to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) those Reserve members:

- Specified or implied as necessary to provide the capabilities presented in already approved SECDEF Deployment Orders (DEPORD) or already approved CJCS requests of the SECDEF to activate Reserve forces. This is allowable provided the requirement is resourced within the allocated Mobilization Cap (MOBCAP) and policy guidance on judicious and prudent use of Reserve forces, backfill for active duty forces, activating

members of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), joint capabilities based solutions, and preparing Reserve force units for activation have been met.

- Required to provide scheduled relief for approved ongoing operational missions with rotational manning.

- Required to meet the internal Title 10 responsibilities of the Military Departments. This is allowable provided the requirement is resourced within the allocated MOBCAP.

For all other requirements to order Reserve members to active duty pursuant to Executive Order 13223 of September 14, 2001, the Secretaries of the Military Departments must obtain SECDEF approval through the CJCS and the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD P&R). These requirements include those that are part of DEPORDs or EXORDs being presented to the SECDEF for decision and those that a Service needs to activate in advance of the DEPORD approval process.

Maximizing Predictability to the Reserve Component

The July (Inset Date), 2002, addendum to the Mobilization, Demobilization, Personnel and Pay guidance establishes a requirement to provide Reserve members with orders in a timely manner to facilitate predictability for them, their families, and their employers. For all but the most urgent operational requirements, provide the Reserve Component service members a minimum of 30 days notice to report for duty. Predictability can be extended to the maximum amount possible by notifying Reserve members that they are being considered for activation.

Once a member is notified of a probable or pending activation, be diligent in assisting them to certify their readiness to activate. Help the families and employers of alerted Reserve members prepare to meet the challenges of the activation period. Transition to the alert period by issuing activation orders as soon as it is operationally feasible.

Many early deploying units have procedures in place to deploy in less than 30-days without negatively impacting service members, their families or employers. For units that do not have these procedures, Reserve force predictability can be achieved through additional mechanisms. Some examples include:

- Identification with Aerospace Expeditionary Force rotations

- Employment in continuing international peacekeeping missions such as those in Bosnia and Kosovo

- Early notification of members being considered for activation

Notification of Reserve members of their pending call to active duty should be managed efficiently. Be skillful in providing them the care and respect they deserve, even when the conditions of their activation are uncertain and the environment is changing.

Sustaining Reserve Component Capabilities

Managing force requirements in support of prolonged contingency operations requires a significant Reserve Component contribution. Use of the Reserve Components must be managed in a way that sustains their capabilities over the long run.

To prevent overstressing capabilities, a process needs to be developed that tracks augmentees and individuals within units who have been previously activated to support the WAR ON TERROR. Further, consider shifting recruiting and retention efforts to target the replenishment of stressed capabilities. Explore innovative training technology to reclassify Reservists not previously activated so as to meet the skill sets for predictable requirements of future campaigns.

The services must begin now to sustain our Reserve forces for future requirements. Some approaches include:

- In the long-term, develop force structure that allows for a "just in time," rather than a "just in case" approach. With this in mind:

  o Construct modular units that can be tailored to support required capabilities

  o Blend Active and Reserve Components to support a common mission and take advantage of the inherent strengths and experience found in our Reserve Component

- Offer financial and other incentives that attract and retain Reservists to stressed units

Joint Capabilities Based Solutions

To ease the pressure on stressed Reserve force capabilities, Combatant Commanders should request capabilities in as much detail as possible without specifying which service will provide them. All services that have forces available to meet a valid requested capability should be used to meet requirements. Source requirements to the service that can, within available forces, best provide the capability. Do so without a bias toward selecting the service that, in the past, has traditionally provided the requested capability. Seek joint force solutions to source Reserve capabilities and to ease the pressure on stressed skill sets within the Reserve Components. Seek joint Reserve force sourcing solutions that are judicious and prudent to meet all requirements externally to the services and to support their internal service requirements for additional activated forces.

Visibility of Reserve Forces

Efficient management of Reserve forces requires full spectrum, real time visibility of our activated Reserve members. In order to manage Reserve Component use judiciously and prudently, to sustain the Reserve force capabilities, to ensure predictable use, and to plan for future campaigns, the Department must have automation systems to provide improved joint visibility in order to answer the following questions:

- What Reserve forces are approved for activation
- What Reserve forces are requested pending approval for activation
- What Reserve forces are currently activated
- Where are they serving, and how long have they been activated
- When they arrived in a theater of operations
- When they are scheduled to rotate out of theater, when they are scheduled to be released from active duty
- What Reserve forces have not been activated
- What Reserve forces are supporting Operational requirements in a training status

Without this level of detail, it is impossible to efficiently provide flexible, agile, and responsive Reserve force capabilities. Full spectrum visibility is also essential to transforming the Reserve force role and toward improving the activation process.

USJFCOM Reserve Component (RC) Mobilization Reform Conference

USJFCOM was tasked by Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff to "develop a more agile, responsive process to mobilize Reserve Component forces and individuals" … through …"changes in Service and joint doctrine, policy and law."[60] On 24-25 September 2003, in coordination with OSD, the Joint Staff, the Services, and the Components, USJFCOM hosted a Reserve Component Mobilization Reform Meeting in Norfolk, VA. During the conference, the teams were organized and the Reserve Component mobilization improvement objectives were determined and validated. The objectives were further separated into two groups—those impacting OIF III and those, which – because of various resource requirements, could only impact the longer term.

Initiatives From USJFCOM Mobilization Reform Conference
OIF III (3 – 6 months)

- Reduce the amount of time from mob to deployment of RC Forces for OIF Rotations
  - Benefit: Will minimize post mobilization training and processing time to minimize RC force activation time and thus maximize utilization time in theater
    - This will reduce "overlap" (time that units are mobilized and training while other units are in theater) and ultimately reduce the number of units that need to be mobilized
    - Provides more time closer to home for RC personnel due to minimizing time at Mob Station
    - Improved medical/dental readiness will reduce medical holdovers following mobilization, and reduce cross-leveling requirements at the Mob Station
    - Reduces mobilization surge requirements
  - Will Require change to the RC process to:
    - minimize post Mob training/processing (medical, dental, legal, security clearances, etc.) maximize "boots on the ground time", and minimize overall time RC forces are activated
    - accessibility to resources (training facilities, DMOSQ schools, medical facilities, equipment upgrades, etc)
    - earlier notification of units and personnel
    - policy changes to perform medical/dental screening and care
    - review of all stages of process to seek efficiencies

---

[60] CJCS Memorandum CM-907-03, Subject: Deployment and Mobilization Process Reforms, 23 April 03

- Develop Title 32 –Title 10 – Title 32 Flexibilities. Change Army/Army Guard mobilization process to better support for homeland defense
  - Benefit/Impact: Provide for immediate activation of Army Guard, Reserve units

- IRR Policy. Allow Services judicious access to the IRR in order to meet operational replacement requirements
  - Benefit/Impact: Improve unit fills, Individual augments, and casualty replacements while minimizing readiness impacts due to cross-leveling

- Early Access to the Supplemental. Given steady state requirements, program now for costs associated with improving readiness of C4 units to meet deployment standards. Reimburse RC components now for costs associated with preparing units for C2 and C1 deployment criteria associated with OIF II, OEF 4
  - Benefit/Impact: Early access to Supplemental will improve readiness preparation of OIF III nits rated below deployment criteria

- 24 Cumulative Month Policy Change. Change current OSD policy counting cumulative reserve mobilization service within the current partial mobilization authority to the consecutive counting under USC Title 10.
  - Benefit/Impact: Planners can better project unit personnel readiness and capabilities which will
    - provide Services with capability of meeting mission requirements for WOT under Title 10 USC 12302
    - allow Reservists to maintain their mobilization potential, irrespective of cumulative time served on active duty, as long as they are deactivated for a period after every 24 months of continuous active duty service
    - allow members to transfer between units and training categories without impacting the personnel readiness of units or IMA detachments
    - will likely result in some Reservists serving on active duty for considerably longer cumulative periods of time, especially those assigned to high demand units
    - provide a lesser degree of consideration for families and the members' civilian employment

- 179 Day End Strength Accounting. Change to Title 10, Section 115 to preclude members serving on voluntary active duty in excess of 1`79 days from counting against Service active duty end strength

- o Benefit/Impact: Eliminates the Service active duty end strength penalty for using volunteers in support of contingency operations which will
  - provide continuity of service for Commander during surge and steady state operations
  - increase personnel management flexibility
  - maximize efficient use of volunteers
  - reduce nee for involuntary recalls
  - allow constraint to be resources vice law

- Adopt a single joint system replicating Navy Marine Corps Mobilization Processing System (NMCMPS) functionality to track mobilization processing for individual mobilized reservists and individual augmentees (active and reserve).
  - o Resource joint capability and align Service tracking tools
  - o Resource authoritative data interfaces to sustain joint mobilization tracking system (e.g., NMCMPS, MANPER-B, NPDB, TAPDB, MILPDS feeds to joint tool). Included functionality: Write orders, Notify, Alert, MOB, Deploy, Redeploy, track medical shots, track clearances, track qualification requirements. Insure inclusion of IRR

MID-Term Objectives

- Joint Qualification
- Maximize Train/Mob/Deploy (Army)
- "Continuum of Service" (FTS)
- Force Sustainability
- Equipment standardization –Joint OCIE
- Mission realignment, force remix (Long Term)
- Intensely manage medical professionals 90 day Mob process, plans, and procedures
- Tem tour (179 day) flexibility – end strength, benefits, money and identify end strength waiver process – make more efficient, effective and understood
- DoD Mobilization planning information
- Determine new IRR utilization policy and availability
- Review/validate GSORTS database (Mid Term)
- Resolve Navy AC/RC DJMS software issue to eliminate impediment to activation/deactivation processing
- Single Pay System

Transformation Concerns

The United States faces terrorism, chemical and biological warfare, regional tensions, and an array of other transnational challenges in an environment of uncertainty, constantly emerging challenges and rapid change. Transformation is a must to ensure we maintain our military advantage. We are developing new concepts, capabilities, and organizations in order to maximize the military's warfighting and combat effectiveness.[61]

Though a large portion of this paper focused on mobilization process reform and the challenges and issues related to effectively activating Reservists, there is more to transform the military services to meet the demand to today's environment. "The end game is this: to get the right reservist, to the right place, at the right time, with the right equipment, for the right mission, to support their active duty counterparts, and then to return home again as soon as it is judiciously possible."[62] Despite the demands of new and emerging missions, the Department must continue to be prepared to respond to the full spectrum of traditional missions from forward presence, to peacekeeping operations, to smaller scale contingencies, to combat operations.[63] The Reserve Components provide units and individuals that augment, enhance, sustain, support, reinforce, and generate Service forces worldwide, as needed.[64]

The mobilization process must be effective and efficient, but in itself is not enough if we do not have the right forces, properly balanced, and managed to meet the current and emerging environmental demands that we face today and in the future. One important aspect of transformation of the military forces is the appropriate mix of Active and Reserve forces in meeting the Department's missions and responsibilities. The military services need to focus on the follow areas:

Rebalance to enhance capabilities [65]

- Resolve platform-based shortages through

    o expanded use of reserves through use of mixed units

    o upgrading older, less capable equipment in reserve units to improve interoperability.

---

[61] OASD, <u>Reserve Component Contribution to National Defense</u>, 1.
[62] OASD, <u>Reserve Component Contribution to National Defense</u>, ix.
[63] OASD, <u>Reserve Component Contribution to National Defense</u>, xii.
[64] OASD, <u>Reserve Component Contribution to National Defense</u>, v.
[65] OASD, <u>Reserve Component Contribution to National Defense</u>, x-xi.

- Resolve skill-based shortages by
  - determining requirements and properly sizing and balancing the active and reserve components as needed

  - an increase in the size of a rotational pool of reservists to obtain/retain hard skills

  - implementing better tracking systems, and developing awards programs to preserve skills.

  - developing partnerships with private industry

- Tools to enhance capability:

  - Expand use of virtual operations, use multi-component units (associate units, blended units, and mixed units), use tailored forces, roundout program, fully integrated units, virtual operations, variable pool of reservists and proper mix of Individual Augmentees (IAs) / Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs)

Creating Flexibility in Force Management [66]

- *"To be most effective, the continuum of service must be supported by a new management paradigm that simplifies access to the reserves and streamlines personnel management practices" to allow reserve participation from 0 to 365 days a year. Key elements include:"*

  - Simplifying the duty status system to include fewer duty statuses.

  - Incorporating more flexibility in personnel policies to provide the tools needed for recruiting, career development, promotion, and separation and retirement. It is essential that the system enable service at any point along the continuum of service by eliminating complexity, which will yield greater efficiency.

  - Ensuring benefits and entitlements are consistent for all members, with the goal of equitable compensation and benefits for a day's work.

---

[66] OASD, Reserve Component Contribution to National Defense, 86-87.

- o Developing an approach to medical benefits that ensures continuity of health care for reservists and their families.

- o Continuing with the development and deployment of a single personnel and financial system.

Emerging Missions

- "The United States faces a wide-range of emerging missions that present tremendous challenges to the Department of Defense. They include: Homeland Security; high-technology mission areas such as intelligence, information operations, space, and unmanned aerial operations; and experimentation. Effectively using both the Active and Reserve components is key to meeting the requirements of new and emerging missions." [67]

---

[67] OASD, Reserve Component Contribution to National Defense, 34.